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POMERANTZ LECTURE
INTRODUCTION*
Norman S. Posert
Although we planned this program more than a year ago, I don't
think we could have chosen a more appropriate time than this spring
for Professor Cox's lecture on the social meaning of shareholder suits.
Recent financial and legal developments are forcing us to think about
both the public benefits and the problems that come with these suits.
Last month the Dow Jones Industrial Average crossed the
symbolic mark of 10,000. Other stock indexes have set records,
reflecting a surge of interest in high-flying technology stocks. As the
price-earnings ratios of these issues-assuming they have
earnings-reach unprecedented levels, many company managements
undoubtedly feel pressure to maintain the growth rate of their
earnings.
It is hardly surprising that the Securities and Exchange
Commission has taken a keen interest in the accounting methods of
some of these companies. But it is a truism that the SEC lacks the
resources to investigate more than a fraction of the questionable
situations that arise. To some extent, the shareholder suit fills the
gap. One of the values of these suits is the deterrence they provide
against corporate misconduct.
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Although the market is said to be dominated by institutional
investors, individual investors are in the market for technology
stocks. Yesterday's New York Times had an article about day traders,
which said: "Having evolved from a nation of savers to one of
investors, America is rapidly becoming a country of traders."1 These
new traders, many of whom cannot afford big losses, nevertheless
find the low cost and ease of trading through the Internet impossible
to resist.
While shareholder litigation is important today, it is likely to
become even more so in coming years, or perhaps months. Kenneth
Galbraith, in his book The Great Crash,2 writes about the "bezzle,"
describing missing corporate funds-like the ring around the
bathtub-that varies in size with the business cycle. The funds tend
not to be noticed during times of prosperity, but they come to light
when earnings turn downward. When that time comes, we can expect
a lot of investor unhappiness and, inevitably, more derivative suits
and class actions.3
In 1995, Congress, acting in the belief that the shareholder suit
often victimizes companies, but fails to provide just compensation to
investors, enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.4 The
1995 Reform Act was intended to create a more even playing field.
As many of you know, the legislation includes several important
changes. For example, one of its provisions is designed to encourage
shareholders with the largest financial interest, usually institutional
investors, to play a larger role as lead plaintiffs in shareholder suits
than they have in the past.5
Perhaps it is too early to tell whether the legislative reforms are
working in the way that Congress contemplated. Legislative changes
sometimes have unanticipated consequences. I hope that this
afternoon's discussion will provide some insights into the role that
the shareholder suit is likely to play under the new legislative
regime.
1 Edward Wyatt, Day Traders are Formidable Market Force, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 1999, at C1.
2 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH, 1929 (1955).
3 See id. at 137-38.
4 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
' See Securities Act of 1933, § 27(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(3) (Supp. 1999);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (Supp. 1999).
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